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De-Secularizing National Space in Georgia1
Construction of a new presidential palace on the model of the White 
House, erection of new buildings; conversion of the old city of Signaghi into 
a Disney Land style Potemkin village; replacement of city centre oriental “ba-
zaars” by Western style shopping malls: Georgia is under construction. The 
direct involvement of the public authorities in the landscaped drawing con-
stitutes a well anchored tradition. Sufficient to remind the statues of Lenin, 
propaganda posters, or the folkorisation of the city through the restoration of 
“Old Tbilisi” in late Soviet time to understand that issues at stakes in trans-
forming the urban cityscape are not only economic (real estate speculation, 
etc..) but also highly political: it aims at erasing the traces of the Soviet past 
and at making visible the governmental program of modernization, includ-
ing in its rationalist and hygienist dimension, and rapprochement with the 
West. Space has not to be understood only in a geographic conception. Pierre 
Nora reminds that the word «space» is torn between two poles of meaning, 
history and geography: in one respect, it refers to a territory, limited by bor-
ders inside which the power is exercised, in another to nature, these two 
poles being indissolubly connected in the definition of French national iden-
tity2. Numerous studies have indeed scrutinized the process by which space 
is invested by the forms of power and have analysed the link between the ap-
propriation of space and nation building. 
In post-Soviet Georgia, the State is not the only institution to shape the 
landscape. A parallel trend can be observed: the saturation of public space 
by religious symbols. Therefore interventions designed to mark the territory 
are a good observing point to investigate the rationale of social and politi-
cal restructuring of relations between Church and State, of the overlapping 
between political and religious spheres and beyond, to understand the new 
polarization of the political arena. 
A first section will investigate how churches draw the outlines of a soft 
territory, slightly different from the national territory. Then we will study 
the impact of landscape transformation by the Orthodox Church of Geor-
gia (OCG) on the conception and policy of cultural heritage. The last sec-




The Soft Territory of Orthodoxy
Repentance, T. Abouladze’s perestroika film ended with the following 
line: “And what a road is needed for, if it does not lead to the temple?” Such 
a replica would be appropriate now: in 2010 Georgia, any road leads to a 
church. As noted by Paul Manning, more churches were built in Georgia dur-
ing the last twenty years than in previous centuries3. 
In Soviet times, as public practice was banned, the defense of national 
identity has helped the Church to ensure its survival. In the 1980s, the na-
tional Church has been a place of cultural resistance, while religious activi-
ties had declined. The collapse of the Soviet Union has created a new con-
text that changes the relationship between national identity and orthodoxy: 
on one hand, the function of the nationalist discourse has changed with the 
existence of an independent State- which is now to shape the future of the 
nation-, on the other hand, persecution of religious practices has ceased, re-
ligion is no longer relegated to the private sphere or confined to the embodi-
ment of a secular idea of the Nation. As in many other contexts, the “return 
of God” is manifest in its public staging: people crossing themselves passing 
a church -a new choreography of everyday life -, fasting - in a context where 
table manners are so constitutive of the modern national identity-4, wearing 
crosses and other distinctive signs, participating in processions and pilgrim-
ages, attending major ritual ceremonies, etc. Those who used to denounce 
the anti-religious persecution regret the “ostentatious” feature of the new re-
ligiosity, condemn the “superficiality”, lack of spirituality of the new believ-
ers and question their faith. 
This ostentation of orthodoxy cannot be understood only as the natural 
and spontaneous irruption of a religion, too long confined to privacy, into a 
hypothetic public sphere: it is mainly the result of a political will and of strat-
egies aiming at re-defining the link between religion and national identity 
and at labeling the territory as a part of Orthodox Christendom. Building 
new churches is part of this strategy, since the motivation is not only to open 
new places of worship, but also to create a landscape reflecting the congru-
ence of religion and national identity.
Orthodox Churches as Markers of the National Territory
For the Orthodox Church of Georgia, such a labeling of the national 
territory requires that Orthodoxy is granted the monopoly over public vis-
ibility, including by building churches. The place to chose is crucial. Often 
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built on a hill, the churches are used to display the Christian essence of the 
Georgian land. They pertain to the same register as the bright crosses that 
line now major roads and contribute to the saturation of public space by 
markers of orthodoxy. In Varketili, when parishioners asked for a plot for 
the new church of the Virgin of Iberia, they were not happy with the land 
granted by the municipality because, aside the main road, it was not notice-
able enough. Therefore, some parishioners tried to negotiate with the rep-
resentatives of state authorities a more visible location in the middle of the 
road, and although City departments have not given their permission, that 
is where the church was finally built5.
The issue is particularly important in areas where part of the population 
is not orthodox. Even when there are no parishioners, churches should be 
built, sometimes in hardly accessible places, or reopened for worship: who-
ever lives there, one has to know this is the Christian land of Georgia. Sev-
eral churches were hence built in Kvemo Kartli, in Marneuli for example, a 
cross was erected near the Red Bridge. In Adjara, 14 new churches have been 
erected, some of them visible only from the Turkish territory. In the border 
village of Sarpi, several are under construction, whereas a mosque stands on 
the other side of the border line. Churches double the border devices, they 
are designed to mark the entry not only on the Georgian territory, but be-
yond that on the territory “of Christendom” (interview with an architect, 
August 2008).
While Muslim Georgians were encouraged to rediscover their “true 
faith”, in minority populated regions, rather than mass conversion, the 
Church top priority was reopening Orthodox churches and reviving histori-
cal dioceses. In the 1990s, in Javakheti, incidents occurred with the Arme-
nian population during a visit of the Catholicos Patriarch in Poka, on the 
Lake Paravani. Later the opening of a convent had also led to some discon-
tent among the local population6. Other incidents broke out in spring 2004 
in Kvemo Kartli7, and once more in Javakheti, when a Mass was celebrated 
in Kumurdo, in a church considered by the local population to belong to the 
Armenian Apostolic Church and the police was sent to prevent ethnic clash-
es8. In this last case, top politicians came in order to attend the Mass. The re-
conquest of lost territories of Orthodoxy was on the agenda of the Church, 
a process seen as parallel to State building and to regaining sovereignty over 
the national territory.
Nevertheless, Church boundaries are not State borders, the canonical 
territory encroaches on neighbor States. The Armenian Apostolic Church 
had protested against the decision taken by the Holy Synod of the Orthodox 
Church of Georgia on February 6, 2006 to restore one of the “historic dioces-
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es” on the north of Armenia and to create the diocese of Dmanisi and Agarak 
Tashir9. In December 2008, in a context of strong tensions over the Armenian 
churches in Georgia groups of Orthodox activists close to the Church held 
a rally outside the Ministry of Culture and in front of the Armenian embas-
sy to demand the transfer under the jurisdiction of the Church of churches 
and Orthodox monasteries located in the Armenian region of Lore-Tachir10. 
Churches and monasteries located in Turkish territory are also the subject of 
intense attention, and dioceses were restored there (Diocese of Batumi and 
Lazeti; Diocese Akhaltikhe and Tao-Klarjeti))11.
While the process of state building requested a national territory with 
well defined borders, the churches sketch an imagined “soft” territory that 
reminds the Georgian Kingdom at its maximum expansion, between 10th 
and 13th century goes, but that goes beyond the territory of modern Georgia.
The Exclusion of Orthodox Places of Worship
Building orthodox churches is not sufficient to label the territory. Pre-
venting building non-orthodox places of worship is also required. Contro-
versies about the visibility of minority religions are not peculiar to Georgia, 
as recently illustrated by controversies that arose in several European coun-
tries. In order to ensure its hegemony over the public space, the Patriarchate 
on the one hand, has raised obstacles to open new places of worship of other 
faiths, and secondly, attempts to turn the churches of non-Orthodox Chris-
tians into orthodox churches. 
All faiths have faced considerable difficulties in constructing new build-
ings, and only a handful of non-Patriarchate places of worship have being open-
ly built without problems. A priori, “traditional religions” (a category which 
continues to influence the management of cults although it is not legally based) 
are better off, but the situations are highly differentiated depending of regions 
and the weight of the confessions involved. In Ajara, for example, mosques open 
in villages where most of the inhabitants are Muslims, while some have public-
ly expressed difficulties encountered in villages, where the Orthodox are a sig-
nificant proportion of the population12. The situation is even more critical in 
Samtskhe-Javakheti, where the Meskhetians have weaker institutions to protect 
them in comparison with their Ajaran coreligionists13. They have complained 
of the destruction and degradation of mosques or attacks upon them14. Even in 
Kvemo Kartli, where the Sunni Azeris constitute a substantial part of the popu-
lation, there have been problems. The Union of Orthodox parishioners has or-
ganized a demonstration against the opening of a mosque in Nizhnyi Bolnisi. 
41
De-Secularizing National Space in Georgia
Catholic, Armenian Churches and some Protestant denominations are 
facing difficulties in obtaining permission to build new churches because of 
pressures from the Patriarchate. Even if attacks against minority religions have 
decreased after the “Rose Revolution”, some communities are victims of vio-
lence when they try to open places of worship. This was the case in 2005 when 
a Baptist community was attacked when trying to build a church in Zestafoni15.
Organizations that have managed to open a place of worship have 
sought to be secretive. For example, a Pentecostal congregation has bought a 
building to turn into its offices, planning to later turn part of it into a sanctu-
ary16. The Jehovah’s Witnesses have been able to build Kingdom Halls across 
Georgia in the last few years but have been careful, refraining from placing 
signs outside their places of worship and trying not to attract attention17. In 
2006, Bishop Pasotto complained that in recent years all the Catholic Church 
has been able to build its “tiny places of worship in out of the way villages”18.
A New “Screaming Stones” Dispute
In order to mark the territory by the orthodoxy, the Church tries not 
only to restrict the construction of non-orthodox places of worship, but also 
to appropriate old buildings of other Christian denominations, that is to say 
primarily the Catholic and Armenian churches19, reviving the old contro-
versy about the “screaming stones”20. Again, the challenge is twofold: to im-
pede the practice of other faiths21, and more crucially, to prevent any public 
visibility. 
Six Catholic churches in major towns –  the port of Batumi, Kutaisi, 
Gori, Ivlita, Ude and Akhaltsikhe - were given to the Orthodox Church and 
have not been returned22. Ivlita church, built in 1298, one of the oldest Cath-
olic churches in Georgia, could not operate due to the absence of Catholic 
priests. The Catholic community of the village then invited an Orthodox 
priest who was to deliver the Catholic mass. Instead, it has been transformed 
into an orthodox church. In 2003, Theodore, the Orthodox Archbishop of 
Akhalitsikhe, Tao-Klarjeti Lazeti has prevented the arrival of the appointed 
Catholic priest23.
The issue of Armenian churches led to significant tensions between the 
Orthodox Church of Georgia and the Armenian Apostolic Church and, by 
extension, between the two states. The most virulent polemic has focused 
on five churches in Tbilisi and one in Akhaltsikhe, all closed to worship and 
claimed by the Orthodox Church of Georgia, who argues that they were built 
on the foundations of Georgian churches. 
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The existing tension since the early 1990s, rose in 2008 when Father 
Tariel, the priest of the church of the Cross, neighboring Norashen, decided 
to carry out work in order to turn it into an Orthodox church24. In the Geor-
gian press, some articles deny that the church has been Armenian while some 
experts attempt to demonstrate the soundness of the Georgian claims25. The 
architectural elements, because they play a crucial role in national identity, 
must be displayed if orthodox or otherwise destroyed. In Norashen, the dis-
content was provoked by the removal of two khachkars and, more recently, 
the enclosing of the church with a concrete fence, the defacing of Armenian 
inscriptions on tombstones, and the bringing in of Georgian tombstone. In 
Catholic churches too, the distinguishing marks were destroyed. In Ivlita, the 
altar was smashed and the graves of French missionaries cemented26. Catho-
lic frescoes and inscriptions of the 18th century were damaged during restor-
ing work supervised by Orthodox priests in Ivlita and Gori27 and the icon of 
the Virgin Mary disappeared in Gori. 
The De-Secularization of National Heritage
The action taken to modify the landscape illustrates a specific concep-
tion of the national territory, which mixes elements of legitimacy based on 
nationalist references and elements of religious legitimacy. But the relation-
ship is reversed compared to the 19th century debates on the “screaming 
stones”: the Orthodox churches do not serve anymore to “prove” the Geor-
gianness of the territory, but on the contrary, the territory being Georgian; it 
has to be displayed as Orthodox28. 
The Catholicos Patriarch, in his Nativity Epistle explicitly defined the 
dual sacredness of the national territory: 
“Homeland is a place that God grants to man on the earth. Certainly, 
Homeland is a marked territory with its nature, natural resources, flora and 
fauna. But, Homeland is far more ... the Homeland is a piece of land enriched 
with your blood ancestors. It is air enriched with your tongue. It is air en-
riched with your tongue. It is environment enriched with your gene, your 
nature. It is a piece of space keeping the whole history of your country and 
nation […].  Its value greatly depends on number of saints praying for the 
nation before God. No nation shall compare with Georgians in that.  Georgia 
has always had great heroes sacrificing their lives to Homeland”29. 
Homeland is formed by glorious past and contemporary fervor togeth-
er. Encouraged by the recognition in the 1995 Constitution and in 2002 con-
stitutional agreement (see below) of its “special role”, the Church has always 
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emphasized the fact that it embodied the history of Nation. This allows it 
to claim its hegemony over the heritage of the past. But the very concept of 
heritage becomes ambiguous when mobilized by religious actors. It results in 
hybridization between the inherently secular elements who founded it (pres-
ervation of the artistic value of the vestiges of the past) and elements of sanc-
tification by Orthodoxy. 
The Transformation of National Heritage 
Historically, for many Georgians, the protection of National heritage 
was the path that led to religion. As soon as anti-religious policies began to 
weaken, the issue of reopening churches and of the preservation of religious 
heritage raised together. Since the 1970s, the revival of the Orthodox Church 
of Georgia and of religious practice was closely linked to the protection of 
cultural heritage. The “national movement” (erovnuli modzraoba) mobilized 
around the defense of national heritage, while the republican authorities re-
acted by organizing programs for the protection and restoration of religious 
architecture. As in other Soviet republics, groups of young volunteers re-
stored historic buildings; intellectuals drew attention to their deterioration or 
to poor restoration work30. In the 1970s and 1980s, the republican authorities 
had substantial resources for heritage preservation and a significant autono-
my of action. E. Shevardnadze, then First Secretary of CP of Georgia, sought 
to cut the grass under the feet of nationalist demands by facilitating restora-
tion programs. He even sent the dissident T. Chkheidze, just out of prison, 
to join the team responsible for the restoration of David Garedji monaster-
ies, then damaged by Soviet Army trainings31.
Many believers have come into the bosom of the Church from con-
cern about the preservation of cultural and historical heritage, such as those 
young volunteers who participated in the renovation of churches and mon-
asteries in the late 1980s32 or such as some priests. For example, the priest of 
the church of St Nicoloz, in Krtsanisi, is an architect by training, and he wrote 
his thesis on urban heritage. His first parishioners were young people who 
had contributed to its restoration and become practitioners through activi-
ties linked with the defense of cultural heritage. No wonder that this is the 
parish attended by the chief architect of the Orthodox Church of Georgia. 
Since the heritage issue was put on the political agenda by activists of 
the national movement, Orthodox religious heritage has been more heav-
ily invested by political actors than other parts of it. The pre-Christian heri-
tage remains a matter for specialists, while the modern heritage (art nouveau 
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paintings of the early XX century, etc.) is very marginal and the preservation 
of industrial and Soviet heritage had never been on the agenda. But, if during 
the Soviet era, religion was integrated into the narrative of the glorious past 
of the nation, from the mid-1990s, the attempt by the Church to capture the 
national heritage reinforces its reduction to its Orthodox dimension. How-
ever, a new trend has emerged in recent years, which put into question the 
secularized conception of cultural heritage. 
Heritage Protection Policy 
The Orthodox Church of Georgia no longer contents with claiming a 
right of user or a property right, but it influences the very definition of what 
is to be considered as their heritage. It claims its legitimacy to assert its mo-
nopoly and control over the procedures of sacralisation of public places, an-
chored in specific architectural norms and in religious practice. Insofar, the 
Church competes with the state on defining the heritage policy, especially 
with the Ministry of Culture. 
The hybrid conception of cultural heritage has an impact on the way the 
Orthodox Church of Georgia shapes the public space. In order to remind the 
Orthodox identity of the national territory, churches have to conform to the 
collective representation of what should be a Georgian church. They should 
not necessarily be ancient churches (as in the logic of cultural heritage), but 
they must look as if they were ancient33. The buildings must comply with 
a national architecture, which is not anymore only a testimony of the past, 
since the collective memory is mainly activated by the religious practice. 
Hence, the Orthodox Church has imposed an architectural style for all new 
churches, now the majority of churches opened for worship. The plans must 
be approved by the competent department of the Patriarchate, the Center for 
Architecture, Restoration and Arts of the Patriarchy of Georgia, which is very 
meticulous about the compliance of new construction with the standards of 
medieval architecture. 
The past has been de-secularized: ancient churches are not seen as ves-
tige of Middle-Age architecture. The aesthetic and historical value of ancient 
buildings makes sense only if those are reopened to worship34, as illustrated by 
the confrontation between the Orthodox Church of Georgia and the Minis-
try of Culture in 2008. The Ministry of Culture had successfully negotiated an 
agreement with the Ministry of Culture of Turkey about the reconstruction of 
some architectural religious complex in Turkey, in a bad condition and endan-
gered. However, the Patriarchate has rejected the terms of the agreement (i.e. 
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the restoration by Georgians of Oshki, Ishkani and Khandzta and the restoration 
by Turkish Medresse to Akhaltsikhe as well as the reconstruction of the Aziz 
mosque in Batumi, not even as a place of worship and, moreover, in the out-
skirts of the city) and has pressured the Minister to break the agreement (inter-
views at the Ministry of Culture, August 2008). Some ancient churches are en-
tirely rebuilt, like the Church of the Assumption of the Virgin, which dates from 
the 8th century, in Dighomi, erected “in the style of the ancient basilicas, with 
decorations that reproduce those churches and Oshki Pakhal in Tao-Klarjeti35.
The restoration of old buildings has hence become a controversial is-
sue. Conflicts have recently emerged between the Church and scholars of 
medieval architecture. In some cases, conservators have been critical about 
restoration work undertaken under the auspices of the Patriarchate, for ex-
ample in the case of the Atenis Zion Church, near Gori. These debates are 
particularly sharp when it comes to buildings listed by UNESCO as part of 
the world heritage, as it is the case since 1994 with the cathedral at Svetitsk-
hoveli, Djvari or Bagrati church near Kutaisi. Because of inappropriate work 
in the vicinity of the complex, Mskheta was put on the list of heritage in dan-
ger in 200936. Reconstruction work was suspended in Bagrati in autumn 2009 
after experts have denounced the materials used in restoration work, and in 
prevision of a planned UNESCO led mission. In both cases, the Patriarchate 
would like to establish a joint committee with representatives of the authori-
ties, the Patriarchate and experts from UNESCO37.
While Mskheta was inscribed on the list of world heritage in danger, a 
public controversy arose over a presidential development project of the site. 
During the first parliamentary session of 2010, the leader of the Christian 
Democrat Georgy Targamadze protests against the project to install a beach 
at the intersection of Aragvi and Kura, “many citizens of Georgia can hard-
ly imagine a beach and swimwear in this sacred place located on a pilgrim-
age route for Georgia, but also for the entire Orthodox world38.” He thinks 
that any development of Mskheta must be done in consultation with the 
Patriarchate. The leader of the oppositional party “Georgian Troupe” (Kar-
tuli dasi) Jondi Bagaturia declared “that Mskheta being the religious capital 
of Georgia, and Svetiskhoveli Cathedral its center, […] the development of 
beach on this site was totally unacceptable”. 
Claims to shape a cityscape according to religious-based conceptions 
are not new. The priest who officiates in the church of St-Nicolas mentioned 
above, in Krtsanisi, launched a petition to prevent the construction of a hotel 
complex on the site of Krtsanisi battlefield near the church. The past and the 
sacred interweave and shape the memorial policy conducted by the Church39, 
a policy aiming at converting memorials in holy places. 
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These examples indicate that shaping public space by Orthodoxy goes 
beyond the building of new churches. The Patriarchate indeed claims an 
influence over the entire national territory. Disputes have risen due to at-
tempts by priests to appropriate ownership of lands neighboring the church-
es. Privatization of land adjoining Svetiskhveli cathedral was one of the rea-
sons for inscribing it on the list of monument in danger40. In town as well 
as in the countryside, numerous non religious buildings or lands have been 
given to the Church, for example, forests in Kakheti, in Akhaltsikhe to Bor-
jomi, Bakuriani41. 
The policy of turning national space into an Orthodox space meets 
strong support from large segments of the population and cannot be sole-
ly attributed to the action of the Orthodox Church of Georgia. On the con-
trary, as seen above, the Patriarchate is also responding to a demand from 
below and social actors encouraging the orthodox “branding” of the nation-
al landscape are heterogeneous: they may be politicians eager to capitalize 
on the Church popularity, priests, but also believers or “patriots” for whom 
the appropriation of the new national space occurs through its merging with 
the religious space. Constructing a new church is usually an individual ini-
tiative, only subsequently validated by the Church. Groups involved in the 
transformation of churches of other denominations in Orthodox churches, 
even if they are manipulated by the Patriarchate, act with some autonomy. 
This was also the case of ultra-Orthodox groups who used to attack minority 
religions (the attitude of the Church toward extremist activists was ambigu-
ous). Disputes about Catholic and Armenian churches and the destruction 
of non-Orthodox heritage arouse little reaction in the Georgian society: the 
religious uniformity of the urban landscape is not seen as a problem and is 
even broadly welcome. 
Claims of the Church go beyond a sole droit de regard over religious 
heritage protection policy: it asserts its legitimacy to intervene in all deci-
sions relative to the whole national heritage, including buildings and arti-
facts, but also nature and landscape. These claims are supported by large 
parts of Georgian society; moreover, the national space has indeed been 
widely appropriated as Orthodox. Secularization can be described as grass-
roots societal change leading to autonomization of a public sphere from re-
ligion42. In Georgia, we are witnessing the opposite process of merging be-
tween the national and the religious fields. This process is not only enforced 
from the top, it is rather the consequence of new conceptions of the nation 
promoted by religious as well as secular actors. That is why we qualify it as a 
process of de-secularization of national heritage.
In any case, the Orthodox Church of Georgia, although favouring the 
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merging of national and religious space, is not the only institution to be 
blamed for the process. Other actors, religious and laity, with various moti-
vations, also contribute to such a development. This can be explained by the 
politicization of this issue. 
Loose Management as a State Response
Why most politicians shared a secular conception of the State and of 
the policy to be implemented, all successive Georgian leaders have tried to 
benefit from the legitimacy provided by Orthodoxy43. They did not perceive 
such a tactical move as a threat, since religion had served the national proj-
ect of the Independent State and since the ecclesiastical institution was weak 
enough to supposedly remain under control. The erection of a monument 
dedicated to St. George, in Tbilisi on Freedom Square, which has been crit-
icized by the Church, illustrates competing –by secular or religious actors- 
mobilization of Orthodoxy44. In such a context, how to explain the appropri-
ation by the Church of the national space? The paradox is that this process 
has accelerated since the arrival to power of M. Saakashvili, that is to say of a 
government who was suspicious vis-à-vis the Patriarchate and strongly com-
mitted to religious pluralism and the freedom of conscience, as proclaimed 
in the legislation45. 
If the legacy of previous policies has undoubtedly contributed to this 
acceleration, most fundamentally, it is the result of the rationale and prac-
tice of public action since the Rose Revolution. The transformation of public 
space is also a good observing point of how State institutions operate.
Dealing with an Ambiguous Legal Legacy
The Church has happened to be in a position to shape or appropriate 
the national space thanks to the restitution of ecclesiastical property, which 
led to granting to it a large share of national heritage. The first text on the 
status of religious buildings was adopted even before the collapse of the So-
viet Union, an evidence of how crucial this issue was. This is a resolution 
of the Council of Ministers of Georgia (still communist) of April 12, 1990 
“on religious issues” which declared “all places of worship of the Orthodox 
Church of Georgia located on the territory of the Republic and all movable 
and immovable property they owned” property of the Church and admit-
ted to it the right to draw up an inventory independently, “according to the 
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rules and traditions of the Church of all Orthodox churches exist in Geor-
gia, as well as their goods and funds”46. But the then existing legislation did 
not allow the implementation of such a resolution. During the first years of 
independence, the restoration of churches was done spontaneously, out of a 
clear legal framework. 
Hence(!) the constitutional agreement signed between the Orthodox 
Church of Georgia and the State on October 14, 2002, although negotiated 
in a specific context and with only one of the players of the religious sphere 
to the exclusion of all others, remains of great importance: it has been so far 
the only act regulating relations between the state and the Orthodox Church. 
The question of church property is central: five of the twelve articles are en-
tirely devoted to this issue. The text states that “the churches, monasteries, 
on duty or not, are the property of the Church as well as the land on which 
they are located”47. There are crucial financial issues at stake48, but as impor-
tant is the question of history. The agreement seeks to compensate the preju-
dice caused during Soviet time. Article 11 recognizes the material and moral 
damages that the Church has suffered while losing its independence (espe-
cially from 1921 to 1990), the State agrees to return to the Church property 
confiscated and pay compensation49. A provision inserted at the last minute 
at the initiative of the Church states: “With the consent of the Church, the 
State issues permits or licenses for the use of official symbols and terminol-
ogy of the Church, as well as for the production, import and distributing 
items of worship “(Article 6, Section 6). An annex to the agreement gives 
a broad definition of “worship items” requiring approval of the Patriarch-
ate; they include the “churches, monasteries and buildings of Ecclesiastical 
purpose (their planning, archaeology, construction, restoration, conserva-
tion)”50. This statute provides the Orthodox Church of Georgia with a huge 
influence over all places of worship. As seen above, the representatives of oth-
er faiths were right to fear that the property confiscated by the Soviet regime 
would never be returned51.
The examination of the conditions in which the constitutional agree-
ment was signed is beyond the scope of this paper. Let us just remind that it 
was negotiated by the Shevardnadze government at a time when it was weak-
ened and in a context where concessions had just been made by the Patri-
archate on vital international issues (including the Pope’s visit to Georgia). 
But the agreement was not put into question nor amended after M. Saakash-
vili came to power, and the analyze of the political use and implementation 
of the agreement gives significant insight on the kind of public policy that 
have contributed to strengthening the public role of the Orthodox Church 
of Georgia. 
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The defense of religious freedom and pluralism was one of the key is-
sues for the new government; many members were activists from the Lib-
erty Institute, one of the most active NGOs struggling against religious dis-
crimination. The authorities have indeed taken action to end violence against 
minority faiths, repeatedly denounced in international reports, and have at-
tempted to address the concerns of minority religions on the difficulties of 
registration, so prejudicial to religious practice52. This shows that the pub-
lic authority has the means to undertake actions in fields considered as a 
priority. 
However, authorities did little to enable the restitution of minority 
faiths property, to protect the non-Orthodox religious heritage, in short, to 
preserve the pluralism of public space. Although since 2007, the Armenian 
church of St. Nshan has been awarded a status of cultural heritage protect-
ed by the Ministry of Culture and Historical Monuments of Georgia it is 
in bad needs for repair. Another Armenian church, St. Gevorg of Mughni 
church, dated from the 13th century, collapsed on November 19 200953. The 
local authorities were passive and did not seek to arbitrate disputes about 
Catholic and Armenian churches, even though they had the means to do so. 
Some Armenian organizations have stressed for example, that permission 
for controversial restoration work in Norashen was delivered by Tbilisi City 
administration. 
Weak Institutionalization as Conflict Resolution Tool
This passivity is the result of a style of politics. The authorities did lit-
tle to clarify  their relations with the Church and have perpetuated Shevard-
nadze tradition of blurred and informal political practices that promote pro-
visional ad hoc and highly personalized arrangements54. 
Georgia, in contrast with other post-Soviet states, has never adopted a 
specific law on religion55. Concrete mechanisms of enforcement of the provi-
sions included in 2002 constitutional agreement have never emerged. None 
of the planned committees have been created so that the inventory of items 
to be returned has never been achieved, paving the way for very different in-
terpretations of what constitutes property of the Orthodox Church of Geor-
gia56. Nana Devdariani the Ombudsman when the agreement entered into 
force, considered for example that the provisions of the agreement declaring 
all Orthodox property in the country to be the property of the Patriarchate 
relate only to property that belonged historically to the Patriarchate, not to 
what has been recently acquired57. 
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Although several texts on the status of Church property have been ad-
opted under the following government, numerous problems remain. The 
2007 Law58 on “the preservation of cultural heritage” (chapter 1, article 2, 
paragraph 3) recalls that the Patriarchate owns a significant part of cultural 
heritage, but does not regulate relations with the State. In addition, there are 
some contradictions between different texts. Administrative structures in-
herited from the Soviet Union (Council for Religious Affairs) fell out of use 
and have not been replaced, so up to now, there is no institution formally 
in charge of relations with the cults. In the absence of bureaucracy, the State 
delegates the actual managing of the relationships with the Orthodox Church 
of Georgia to personal networks, hence contributing to its dependence on 
religious legitimacy. Civil servants or politicians who serve as intermediar-
ies between the Patriarchate and the authorities are unofficially mandated 
precisely because they are known as pious and/or because of their good rela-
tions with the Church.
This functioning of the State based on weak institutionalization is not 
specific to relations with the cults, but the trend is exacerbated in this field. 
The first reason for such specificity is the popularity enjoyed by the Church 
and its status in public opinion59. The involvement or even the sole mention 
of the Church in a project is likely to significantly facilitate all administrative 
procedures such as land registration, registration of property deeds, connect-
ing to the electricity grid, etc. 
Second reason: the lack of formal and clear procedures provides lead-
ers with political resources that become instrumental when their popularity 
withers. For example, the restitution of the property, which has been taking 
place without adequate transparency, provides the government with an op-
portunity to develop clientelistic strategies. Pre-election periods are particu-
larly fruitful for the Patriarchate: plots of land or real estate have been gen-
erously transferred by Presidential Decree. But informal procedures-based 
policies are fragile and sometimes risky, as illustrated by the controversy sur-
rounding the construction of a church on a hill near Batumi, in Peria. Mu-
nicipal authorities had declared the construction illegal under the pretext 
that no building permission had been granted to it. The building was then 
destroyed overnight (it is not clear by whom). But in fact, most churches re-
cently built in Ajara are not adequately registered, have no status or hybrid 
status. According to some rumors, in this precise case, the president planned 
to build a recreation center, according to others, this land was also coveted 
by the Ministry of the Interior (whose minister is a Catholic): in any case, 
personal related motivation is seen as the main rationale for prevention the 
church construction. The reaction of the clergy has been so strong that the 
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authorities who had opposed the construction have been disallowed at the 
higher level. A new church is being built in the same place. As illustrated in 
this case, mechanisms intended to strengthen the power leads precisely to the 
weakening of the state and reinforce the Church. 
The lack of precise rules, as well as contradictions between existing 
laws, leads to systematization of exceptions and to providing bureaucracies in 
charge of their implementation with substantial room for maneuver. Hence, 
the gap is huge between the declared policies and actual practices, between 
what is decided at the “top” of the state and what is implemented at lower 
levels of bureaucracy. Thus, evidence abounds of administrative harassment 
preventing the opening of non orthodox places of worship. While minority 
faiths are free to operate by law, their members face bureaucratic discrimi-
nation and encounter difficulties to have their legal rights to free worship 
recognized60. For example, according to T. Nakaidze, an activist from an ajar 
NGO, in 2008, when the Georgian Muslims built a mosque in Aspindza, “the 
head of the local administration asked if [they] had permission from the pa-
triarchate”61. In addition, interviews conducted in various ministries show 
clearly that those involved in the relations between Church and State have a 
poor knowledge-or even total ignorance- of the existing legislation, which is 
much hence less compelling than tacit agreements with Patriarchate62. 
The third reason for such a loose management is that it is seen as an 
efficient conflict prevention device. The lack of formalization and of insti-
tutionalization of arrangements makes them temporary and dependent on 
short-term balance of power. This is why the Orthodox Church of Georgia 
has repeatedly requested that rules defining ownership be clearly established, 
while the government does not want. The Patriarchate has been trying to in-
stitutionalize its gains, while for the state the blurring of the rules is seen as 
an opportunity to change them when needed. That does not mean that laws 
and rules, even dormant, are irrelevant: the Church representatives or other 
religious groups close to it regularly refer to the existing legal framework to 
justify the de facto situation. The constitutional agreement has a legitimiz-
ing function of informal relations, and precisely because legislative acts are 
necessary to make the bargaining arrangements sustainable, the authorities 
prefer to avoid them. 
The government hopes to reverse the balance of power without having 
to open a public debate, in itself perceived as a threat because it could acti-
vate social and political cleavages. Discussion about the role of the Church is 
especially threatening since it has become one of the issues that create most 
polarization inside Georgian society. As Orthodoxy has become a funda-
mental element of Georgian identification, conflicts around religion might 
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be structured along ethnic lines, a nightmare for political leaders. Moreover 
all ideological and political cleavages, even when they are not related to re-
ligious issues, tend to find a public expression through religion, a tendency 
that has accelerated in 2008-200963: conceptions of national identity, endog-
enous legitimacy versus exogenous political legitimacy, pro-Western versus 
national or pro Russian orientation, etc. 
On February 10, 2010, a student rally was held in the church Bagrati to 
protest against the signing of a memorandum of cooperation between for-
mer Prime Minister Z. Noghaideli and United Russia: churches have become 
the arena of political struggle64. This example illustrates that the shaping of 
national space participates in the development and of the definition of a po-
litical space. Building churches leads to setting the framework inside which 
political confrontation is thought and can take place, to drawing the bound-
aries between what is legitimate and what is not and finally to defining the 
borders of the relevant political community.
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